In this study we examine the impact of insurer contract nonperformance upon Wilson's adverse selection equilibrium where consumers exhibit constant absolute risk aversion. When the market equilibrium retains its original form (i.e., pool or separation), premiums and coverage levels generally fall, although the change in coverage level for good risks is ambiguous when the equilibrium is separating. When the market equilibrium changes form, the change in premium and coverage levels is generally ambiguous, although one can determine that good risk premiums go down when the equilibrium shifts from pooling to separating and that bad risk premiums and coverage levels go down when the equilibrium shifts from separating to pooling. Interestingly, we find that although the introduction of insurer default risk makes good risks worse off, this is not necessarily true for bad risks. Bad risks can be better off because the decrease in the price differential between types can make pooling relatively more attractive to good risks in the presence of default risk.
INTRODUCTION
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nonperformance by the insurer.
1 Doherty and Schlesinger (1990) show that a risk averter will not purchase full coverage at fair prices, that coverage purchased is not, in general, a monotonic function of the risk of insurer default, coverage purchased is not necessarily negatively related to the level of loading, individuals who are "more risk averse" (in the sense of Ross, 1981) need not purchase more insurance, and (when default is partial) there is no monotonic relationship between the level of coverage and the extent of recovery. The consequences of contract nonperformance upon "standard" insurance results are thus quite severe.
It is also well recognized in the literature that the operation of insurance markets is significantly affected by adverse selection (e.g., Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976 , Wilson, 1977 , and Spence, 1978 ). Wilson's (1977) model of adverse selection suggests that the equilibrium will either involve a pooling contract or a pair of separating contracts. If a pool results, it provides the coverage level optimal to the good risks at the pool price. Separation occurs when the better risks prefer a limited coverage contract (with the better risk coverage level sufficiently limited that higher risks prefer a full coverage contract at a price fair to the higher risks) at a price fair to the better risks to any contract at a price fair to the overall pool. Adverse selection insurance markets may be significantly impacted when background risk (Agarwal, 1995) or severity risk (Doherty and Schlesinger, 1995; Ligon and Thistle, 1996) are present. The primary difference between these studies and ours is the correlation between insurable losses and the additional risk introduced; we explore the impact of contract nonperformance upon a market with adverse selection.
We analyze the impact of the introduction of a third (default) state of the world upon the nature of the Wilson equilibrium (pooling or separating), including its impact on the level of coverage, the premium paid, and societal welfare. We find, as did Doherty and Schlesinger (1990) , that contract nonperformance often generates indeterminate results compared to "standard" models, even with strong restrictions on preferences. However, these ambiguities imply that nonperformance may have a surprising impact on insurance markets, including the possibility that some consumers may be better off in the presence of default risk.
ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUALS' EXPECTED UTILITY IN A PREMIUM-INDEMNITY SPACE
We assume that consumers maximize a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function over random wealth, EU i (W ), with state independent utility U (U' > 0, U" < 0). Consumers have a fixed background wealth, W 0 , and a probability p i of suffering an insurable loss, L, with L < W 0 . Insurance is available at a premium rate, P = λ p i α L, where α L is the promised indemnity, with α < 1, and λ is an expense loading factor with, λ > 1. Thus, with no risk of insurer default (n.d.r.), the expected utility of type-i consumers with respect to the insurance decision is 1 Nonperformance suggests insolvency. However, as Doherty and Schlesinger (1990) point out, other interpretations exist. For example, uncertain legal standards may restrict as well as extend coverage, unexpected delay in payment could (given the time value of money) be considered a partial default, and contractual provisions (possibly beyond the insured's control) may deny or limit coverage.
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The insurer's probability of honoring a contract is q (> 1 -q, 0 < q <1), which is common knowledge. If a loss occurs, the consumer (insured) will either be indemnified (in the amount α L), if the insurer honors the contract, or receive nothing, if the insurer does not (i.e. there is no partial default). Then, when α > 0, there are three states of nature: no loss, loss with no default of the insurer, and loss with insurer default. In one of the loss states, the consumer is actually worse off after purchasing insurance; her wealth not only decreases by the amount of loss, but she has also paid a worthless premium. The consumer's expected utility in the presence of default risk (d.r.) over these three states can be written
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If the premium, P , is unchanged (i.e. P = P), then consumers are clearly worse off in the presence of default risk. When P = P, the wealth distribution in the no default risk case stochastically dominates (in the first degree) the wealth distribution in the default risk case. However, we assume that competition in the insurance market forces the premium in the presence of default risk to P = λ q p i α L. That is, the premium paid in the presence of the default risk is adjusted to the expected value of the indemnity including the probability of default times the loading factor, λ. If λ = 1, insurance is actuarially fair in both the no default risk and default risk cases. However, when λ = 1 the construction of P implies expected wealth in (2) is a mean preserving spread of expected wealth in (1) and, hence, the concavity of U implies EU i (W )| n.d.r. > EU i (W )| d.r. for any level of coverage α < 1.
2 This result does not generalize to the case of λ > 1. The Wilson (1977) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) adverse selection analyses (hereinafter WRS) were conducted under assumptions of perfect competition and actuarially fair premiums (λ = 1). We will conduct our analysis in a similar environment.
One of the keys to the WRS analysis is the fact that individuals with different loss probabilities (risk types) are willing to trade wealth in the no loss state for wealth in the loss state (or premium for indemnity) at different rates. Consequently, the indifference curves for different risk types have a single crossing property in state or premium-indemnity space. By varying contracts with respect to premium and 2 See Bawa (1975) for a discussion of stochastic dominance and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) for a discussion of mean preserving spreads. indemnity levels, it is possible to create policies that appeal to one risk type but not others. The starting point for our analysis is examination of the way in which default risk impacts the willingness to trade wealth between the no loss and loss states.
The key insight is most easily obtained by examining the slope of the indifference curve in premium-indemnity space at any arbitrary level of premium P 0 . To do so we totally differentiate (1) and (2) with respect to premium, P 0 , and indemnity, α L and set the expression equal to zero. Solving, we find
in the no default risk case, and
In the default risk case. Comparing (3) and (4), we have
When there is a risk of default on the indemnity payment by the insurer, the indifference curves of individuals become less bowed at the same premium level. 3 The rate at which individuals will trade premiums for indemnity (or no loss state wealth for loss state wealth) declines. In a sense, the individuals behave "as if" they were less risk averse.
In the next section we develop a framework for incorporating this property in a WRS analysis.
A FRAMEWORK FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF ADVERSE SELECTION EQUILIBRIA IN THE PRESENCE OF DEFAULT RISK
In this section we develop a procedure for conducting WRS analysis in the presence of default risk. The analysis is conducted in state space. With a risk of insurer insolvency, the consumer faces three states of nature. However, this three-state model can be reduced to a two-state model in state space using the independence axiom. Under the independence axiom, one can estimate the wealth in the loss state independently of the wealth in the no loss state. The loss state is a compound lottery of two states: insurer default and no insurer 3
Because adverse selection analysis may be conducted in both state space and premium indemnity space, we avoid the confusion engendered by the characterization of the changed properties of the indifference curves as less concave or less convex and refer to their more nearly linear nature as less bowed.
default. This gamble for the distribution of wealth can be reduced to a single certainty equivalent of wealth for both states.
In Figure 1 , wealth in the no loss state is on the abscissa and wealth in the loss state is on the ordinate. The 45° line through the origin represents equal wealth in both states or full insurance. The Promised Benefit/Fair Price Line represents the set of policies (and, hence, post-indemnity wealth combinations) from α = 0, at the endowment, to α = 1, at the full insurance line, available at the default risk adjusted actuarially fair premium P = q p i α L (i.e. it represents the fair odds line based on the default risk adjusted price, q p i , and the promised benefit, α L). The Default Benefit Line represents the set of wealth combinations in the event of insurer default for corresponding levels of α. Since, in the event of default, the insured simply has her endowment in each state reduced by the amount of the premium paid, this line runs from the endowment (α = 0) toward the abscissa (increasing levels of α) at a 45° angle (i.e. with slope equal to one). The wealth of the consumer in the loss-no default and loss-default states can be averaged to a single weighted mean level of wealth. The Average Benefit Line shows the locus of all combinations of these weighted mean levels of loss state wealth and corresponding levels of no loss state wealth. By construction, the average benefit line will have the same slope as the fair odds line in the no default risk case.
4 However, with risk averse consumers, we need the certainty equivalent value of loss state wealth, not expected wealth, in order to analyze the impact of default risk on a WRS equilibrium. Let the certainty equivalent of a risky indemnity payment with a premium P be
where π is the risk premium associated with premium P . Thus, π is the premium an individual would be willing to pay to avoid the risk of insurer default or, conversely, c is the certain indemnity an individual would be willing to accept at a stated indemnity level, αL, to avoid insurer default risk. The results of Doherty and Schlesinger (1990, 246-247) suggest that for general preference structures the risk premium associated with the certainty equivalent may not be monotonic. In that event, the certainty equivalent curve, representing the set of certainty equivalents associated with varying levels of α, would not be a convex surface. One case in which the relationship between α and q is monotonic is when preferences exhibit constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). In the case of CARA preferences, we also find a monotonic relationship between the risk premium associated with the loss state lottery and α, and, hence, a convex certainty equivalent surface. Specifically, the certainty equivalent is an increasing concave function of α, which implies the risk premium, π, is an increasing convex function of α. To see this, write 4 The slope of the average benefit line is q [ -
which is the slope of the fair odds line in the no default risk case.
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Solving for c and differentiating c with respect to α yields
This derivative is > 0 for α, a, L and q > 0. The second order condition is
which is < 0 for α, a, L > 0, 1 > q > 0, and a α L < 4. Hence, c is an increasing concave function of α. Let γ be a positive coverage scalar such that α < α γ < 1, and π γ and c γ be the risk premium and certainty equivalent, respectively, associated with this coverage level. Then, q γ α L -π γ = c γ . Since q γ α L increases linearly in γ and c is concave in γ, π increases at an increasing rate in γ, or π is an increasing convex function of coverage. The set of certainty equivalents is represented on Figure 1 by the Certainty Equivalent Line. The risk premiums are represented graphically by the vertical distance between the certainty equivalent line and the average benefit line, which gets larger as insurance coverage increases. Incorporating the impact of default risk into this certainty equivalent, rather than the individuals' indifference curves, provides a convenient framework for the analysis of WRS equilibria because it combines the impact of changes in prices, expected benefits, and attitudes toward risky insurance. With this approach, the shape of indifference curves does not change with the introduction of default risk.
As in most WRS analyses, the relevant issues can be examined by assuming that there are just two unidentifiable risk types, bad risks (with loss probability p B ) and good risks (with loss probability p G ) where p B > p G . The loss probability for the overall pooled population is p P = x p B + (1-x) p G , where x is the proportion of bad risk types in the market. The following relationships between the slopes of the fair odds lines, the slopes of the certainty equivalents, coverage levels, loss state wealth, and no loss state wealth prove useful in analyzing equilibrium in a market with two risk types exhibiting CARA preferences.
The slope of the fair odds line before the introduction of default risk is
Following the introduction of default risk the slope of the average benefit line is
Let Y i C be the slope of the certainty equivalent line for an individual with loss probability p i . The increasing risk premiums defined by equation (8) and the convexity of the risk premiums implied by (9) imply, for Y> 0,
Or, for a given risk type, the slope of the certainty equivalent line is less negative than the fair odds or average benefit lines. The relationship between wealth levels, coverage levels, and the slopes of the contract sets (i.e. the certainty equivalent line or the fair odds line, as appropriate) is given by the following relations. In the absence of default risk, for a given loss probability (and, hence, a given contract set slope, Y) and any two insured loss state wealth levels, W L 1 , W L 2 , the coverage levels implied are
And for any two contract set slopes Ψ i and Ψ j , insured loss state wealth level, W L , and post-premium no loss state wealth level, W NL ,
Relation (11) implies that, along a given contract set line, higher loss state wealth implies higher coverage. Relation (12) implies that, for a given loss state wealth, a less steeply sloped contract set line implies higher coverage, and, for a given level of no loss state wealth, a less steeply sloped contract set line implies lower coverage.
THE RELATIVE LIKELIHOOD OF SEPARATION IN THE PRESENCE OF DEFAULT RISK
At first glance, the inequalities in (5), which indicate that individuals are less willing to trade premium dollars for insurance coverage in the presence of default risk, suggest that separating equilibria may be relatively more likely and pooling relatively less likely in the presence of default risk. Separation occurs when good risks are unwilling to trade a low price-low coverage policy for one with more coverage and a higher price. Pooling occurs when they are willing to pay the price for the increased coverage. The inequalities in (5) taken by them suggest pooling is less likely in the presence of default risk. However, that is only part of the default risk story. Default risk also has the impact of decreasing the relative pricing differentials between the risk classes. The certainty equivalent line lies π α below the average price line and for a given α this distance is invariant in p i . Consider what happens to the relative slopes of the good risk and pooled no default fair odds lines, the promised benefit lines, and the respective certainty equivalent lines. The slope differential between the good risk and the pooled no default fair odds line is
The slope differential between the promised benefit price lines in the default risk case is
Or, the default risk promised benefit lines are closer together than the no default risk fair odds lines. This property also holds for the certainty equivalent lines. Relation (12) suggests that α L (W NL ) > α P (W NL ) for a given W NL < W 0 . Equations (8) and (9) imply that c is an increasing concave function of α. Thus, for a given level of W NL < W 0 , the certainty equivalent line for low risks will lie further below its average benefit line (or, equivalently, its no default fair odds line) than the certainty equivalent line for the pool lies below its average benefit line (or, equivalently, its fair odds line). This implies that for any
or the slope differential between the good risk and the pool certainty equivalent lines is smaller than the differential of the respective fair odds lines in the no default case. The intuition is that the relative price difference for insurance for the various risk types falls as the likelihood of insurer performance, q, falls. That is, for any α > 0, P P P G − = q P P -q P G = q (P P -P G ) < P P -P G . In effect, introduction of default risk helps "solve" the adverse selection problem because, as the likelihood of insurer payment declines, the cost differential of insurance across risk types declines. In effect, the cost to the low risks of pooling is lower in the presence of default risk. The compression of the price differential between the risk classes offsets the fact that individuals are relatively less willing to pay for coverage. This result has important implications for adverse selection equilibria because it implies that one cannot conclude that separation (or more generally subsidization) is relatively more or less likely in the presence of default risk.
IMPACT OF DEFAULT RISK ON AN INITIAL POOLING EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we assume that, in the absence of default risk, the market is in a Wilson pooling equilibrium. 5 Consider first the case of the shift from one pooling equilibrium to another. Since the pooling equilibrium occurs at the tangency of the good risk indifference curve to the pooled fair price line (or in the default risk case the certainty equivalent line) and since the slope of the contract set has become flatter (|Ψ P C | < |Ψ P F |), tangency can occur only at a relatively lower level of α. Thus, coverage is lower for both types, and, since P L q p p p / α = , premiums per dollar of coverage are also lower for both types by a factor of q. Further, since the certainty equivalent line for the pool lies everywhere below the original fair odds line, any good risk indifference curve tangent to the certainty equivalent line must be below the indifference curve tangent to the original fair odds line. Hence, good risks are strictly worse off. There is a set of policies lying below the original fair odds line that make bad risks better off, but only if the coverage level increases above the original level. Since we know that coverage levels fall, bad risks are also strictly worse off; since both types are worse off, society is clearly worse off.
We now consider the case where the original equilibrium is pooling and the equilibrium following the introduction of default risk is separating. This case is illustrated in Figure 2 . The impact on coverage levels and premiums per dollar of coverage on bad risks is ambiguous. Normally, bad risks' coverage and premiums would increase in the move from a pooling to a separating equilibrium (in fact, in a separating equilibrium bad risk coverage is normally full at P = p B L). However, the introduction of default risk implies that |Ψ B C | < |Ψ B F | making a partial coverage policy optimal (which might be lower than the coverage at the initial pool) and the price per dollar of coverage will be q p B (which might be lower than p P ). Which of these effects dominate is dependent upon parameter values.
What of bad risk welfare? Note that
where EU b | n.d.r. @J is the expected utility of bad risks at the old pooling contract J with no default risk, EU b | n.d.r. @X is a similar measure at full coverage on their fair price line (contract X) with no default risk, and EU b | n.d.r. @X' is a similar measure at the new 5 Miyazaki (1977) has shown that a Wilson pooling equilibrium is dominated by a separating equilibrium with appropriate taxes and subsidies between risk classes. However, since the relative willingness of good risks to subsidize bad risks in the presence of default risk is generally indeterminate, analysis of the Wilson equilibrium allows one to adequately understand the ways in which default risk impacts the market. separating contract, X', with default risk. The first inequality holds because the preexistence of the pooling equilibrium implies bad risks preferred J to X. The second inequality holds because the certainty equivalent line for bad risks lies everywhere below the (no default) fair odds line for bad risks and hence the indifference curve tangent to the certainty equivalent line (at X') must lie everywhere below the indifference curve through X. Thus, bad risks are strictly worse off in the new separating equilibrium.
With a shift from a pool to separation, the premium per dollar of coverage for good risks will decline, since P G /α L = q p G < p P . However, the impact on good risks' coverage is ambiguous. This result is somewhat surprising since good risk coverage would normally fall in a shift from a pooling to a separating equilibrium. However, default risk introduces an offsetting effect. Since it lies everywhere below the bad risk indifference curve through J, the bad risk indifference curve defining Y' implies a lower loss state wealth equivalent. However, the impact of default risk is to shift policies to the more shallowly sloped certainty equivalent lines. Using relations (11) and (12), if the slope implied by Ψ L C is less than Ψ P F , offsetting effects exist and the result is ambiguous.
What of good risks' welfare? From the self selection constraints for a separating equilibrium, X' is at least marginally preferred to Y' by bad risks, and by substitution of Y' for X' in (16), it is inferred that
where EU b | d.r. @ Y' is the expected utility of bad risks with default risk in the new separating equilibrium at the good risk contract. Inequality (17) can be written as
where ∆P and ∆αL denote the premium and coverage changes respectively between contracts J and Y'. From inequality (17) it follows that
Replacing p b by p g in (19) will not change the inequality. Therefore
where EU g | n.d.r. @ J is the expected utility of good risk individuals with no insurer default risk in the pooling equilibrium at contract J and EU g | d.r. @ Y' is a similar measure with insurer default risk in the separating equilibrium at contract Y'. Thus, good risk types are also strictly worse off in the new separating equilibrium. Since both types are worse off with default risk, society is clearly worse off. The results of this section are summarized in Table 1 . 
IMPACT OF DEFAULT RISK ON AN INITIAL SEPARATING EQUILIBRIUM
We consider first a shift from an existing separating equilibrium to a new separating equilibrium. This case is illustrated in Figure 3 . We know that the price of coverage for both types goes down since P i / L α = qp i < p i , i = B, G. Because the slope of the bad risk certainty equivalent line is less than the bad risk no default fair odds line, we know that the tangency of the default case bad risk indifference curve to the bad risk certainty equivalent must occur at a lower coverage level (i.e. α < 1). The effect on coverage for good risks is ambiguous for essentially the same reasons that the relative levels of good risk coverage are ambiguous in the shift from a pooling to a separating equilibrium. Because the certainty equivalent lines for both types lie below the respective no default fair odds lines, the indifference curves through the equilibrium policies in the new separating equilibrium must lie below the respective indifference curves through the original separating policies for the respective types. Hence, both types and society must be worse off.
We now consider the case when a no default separating equilibrium shifts to a pooling equilibrium following the introduction of default risk. In this case the premium per dollar of coverage (P P /αL = q p P < p B ) and coverage levels for bad risks clearly fall (coverage was previously full). However, the results for the good risks are ambiguous. Although a shift from a separating equilibrium to a pooling equilibrium normally involves an increase in price and an increase in coverage, here the default risk operates to reduce the pooled price (P P /αL = q p P may be less than p G ). Since the tangency of the good risk indifference curve with the pool certainty equivalent curve is dependent on the slope of the latter, the relative coverage levels offered to the good risk types in the new contract versus the old contract are parameter specific.
The welfare of good risks clearly falls. The certainty equivalent line for the pool lies below the no default fair odds line for the pool. Since the good risk indifference curve through the original separating policy must lie above the no default fair odds line for the pool (or separation would not have been optimal), the low risk indifference curve tangent to the pool certainty equivalent line must lie everywhere below the original low risk indifference curve through the original separating policy Y. Hence, good risks are worse off. What of bad risks? We know
(20) where EU g | n.d.r. @ Y is the expected utility of good risk individuals without insurer default risk in separating equilibrium at contract Y and EU g | d.r. @ Z is a similar measure for good risk individuals with insurer default risk in pooling equilibrium at the contract Z. Inequality (21) can also be written in an analogous fashion to (19) (with the probabilities reversed). However, using similar arguments we see that substituting p b for p g may change the inequality. Hence, bad risks may prefer Z to Y. From the self-selection constraints for a separating equilibrium, bad risks only marginally prefer their full coverage high price contract to Y. Thus, the utility of bad risks at Z may be higher than at the original separating contract and the welfare change for bad risks is ambiguous. Thus, the addition of default risk could actually make bad risks better off than they were in the absence of default risk. This somewhat surprising result can occur because the compression of the price differential between good and bad risks reduces the cost of the low risk subsidy, which may induce good risks to subsidize where they would not before. Since bad risks could be better off, societal welfare change depends upon the social welfare function and is also ambiguous. The results of this section are summarized in Table 2 . 
CONCLUSIONS
This study has examined the impact of contract nonperformance upon adverse selection equilibria where premiums are fair and consumers have CARA utility. In general, when the equilibrium retains its original form (i.e. shifts from one pooling to another or one separating to another) coverage levels and premiums per dollar of coverage fall. There is an exception with respect to the change in good risk coverage, which is ambiguous, in the shift from one separating equilibrium to another. When the equilibrium changes form (i.e. from pooling to separating or vice versa), the impact on premium per dollar of coverage and coverage levels is frequently ambiguous. However, one can definitively state that good risk coverage will fall in the case of shift from a no default pool to default risk separation and that bad risk premiums per dollar of coverage and coverage levels fall in the shift from no default separation to a default risk pool. Although in many cases the response of insurance markets with adverse selection to default risk is ambiguous, we have found some surprising implications. Even though the introduction of default risk generally makes individuals worse off, there is an exception. In the case where a separating equilibrium preexists and the equilibrium shifts to a pool following the introduction of default risk, bad risks may actually be better off after the introduction of default risk. Such a result can occur because, somewhat surprisingly, whether separation or pooling is relatively more likely in the presence of default risk is ambiguous. The fact that individuals are less willing to trade premium dollars for coverage is offset by the fact that the relative price differentials between risk classes decreases in the presence of default risk. One interesting implication of the results is that they suggest the possibility that attempts, by insurers or regulators, to decrease default risk may be viewed differently by consumers in markets with adverse selection than by those in markets where adverse selection is not a problem.
